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1  Introduction 
The axiomatic foundation of the expected utility theory (which states that given a set of 
uncertain prospects individuals pick up the prospect which yields the highest expected 
utility) was first laid down by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Their work 
inspired various authors to suggest alternative sets of axioms compatible with the 
expected utility theory. The axiom of independence is one of the axioms which is used, 
either directly or indirectly, to establish the expected utility theory. This axiom has come 
under severe criticisms in recent years. A large number of experiments have shown that 
in making decisions involving uncertain prospects people frequently violate the 
independence axiom. In this paper we shall consider the problem of choice under 
uncertainty from a wider point of view and we shall examine the nature of the restriction 
imposed by the axiom of independence. We shall use the mean-variance utility function 
to prove our point. Then we shall consider a weak version of the independence axiom 
namely the weak* axiom of independence. This is the point of departure from the 
expected utility theory to the realm of the non-expected utility theory. The weak* axiom 
allows aversion to pure uncertainty and, in the context of the mean-variance utility 
theory, it is compatible with utility being an increasing function of expected returns at all 
levels. 
2 Choice In The Moment-Space Of Lotteries 
Consider any finite interval [a, b] on the real line as the outcome (prizes) space for 
lotteries which may be regarded as probability distribution functions, F (.), defined on 
the outcome space. We consider the class of lotteries for which all moments of the 
corresponding distribution functions exist (some of them may be zero) and the 
distribution functions are uniquely defined by their moments. This uniqueness property 
requires some minor restrictions on the distribution functions and excludes some 
pathological cases [see Karlin and Shapley (1953) or Widder (1949, pp. 29-31, 60)]. We 
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define the i-th non-central moment of a distribution as µ i = E(xi). The utility from an 
uncertain prospect F(.) may be written as a functional, 
U = U [F(.)] = U (µ1 ,µ2 ,µ3….. )    (1) 
Eq. (1) merely states that we can define the utility functions on the moment space of lotteries. 
We shall see that any compound lottery, G, involving two lotteries F1 and F2 with 
probabilities p and (1-p) respectively may be regarded as a convex combination of F1 and F2 
in the moment space of the lotteries, i.e. if 
 
F1: [ µ1(1) , µ2(1) , …..] and F2 : U [ µ1 (2) , μ2(2), ….. ] 
then, 
G : [p.µ1(1) + (1-p), µ1(2), p.µ2(1) + (1-p). µ2(2) , …..] 
 
In order to see this we need the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1. 
Let F1 and F2 be two arbitrary lotteries with µt(1) and µt(2) as their non-central moments 
of order t, then the moment of order t for the compound lottery G = (F1, p; F2, 1-p) will 
be given by 
µt(G) = p.µt (1) + (1-p).µt(2) 
Proof 
Let f1, f2 and g be the probability density functions of F1(x1), F2(x2) and G(x) 
respectively. Remember, G is a compound lottery yielding either of the lotteries F1 and 
F2 as outcome. G can yield a final outcome, say d, either through F1 achieving d or 
through F2 achieving d. Therefore, 
Prob (x = d ± ∈) = p.[Prob (x1 = d ± ∈)] + (1-p).[ Prob (x2 = d ± ∈)] 
This implies that the probability density function for the compound lottery G is given by, 
FG (x) = p.F1(x) + (1-p).F2(x) 
Hence the non central moment of G for any order t is given by, 
µt(G) = ∫xt.fG(x) = ∫xt.[p.f1(x) + (1-p).f2(x)].dx = p. µt(1) + (1-p).µt(2) 
(Q.E.D.) 
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Henceforth, for the sake of avoiding unnecessary repetitions, the non-central moments 
of order t will be referred to simply as moments and denoted by μt. 
 Let us now turn to the independence axiom and a weaker version of it called the 
betweenness axiom. We shall explain how they restrict the form of the utility function in Eq. 
(1). Consider, three lotteries F1, F2 and F3. Construct two compound lotteries G1 and G2 such 
that, 
 
  G1 = ( F1 ,  p  ;  F3 ,  1-p ) 
    (2) 
  G2  = ( F2 ,  p  ;  F3,  1-p ) 
 
G1 is a compound lottery with p as the probability of winning F1 and 1-p as the 
probability of winning F2. G2 should be interpreted in a similar way. Following the 
convention used by Sen (1970) we use the symbols P, R and I to denote strict 
preference, weak preference and equivalence respectively. For example, F1 R F2 means F1 is 
weakly preferred to F2. 
 
Axiom of Independence : F1 P F2 ( or, F1 I F2 ) implies G1 P G2 ( or, G1 I G2 ) 
Betweenness Axiom : F1 I F3, implies F1 I F3 I G1 
 
The independence axiom serves as a corner stone of the expected utility theory. In an 
effort to generalize the expected utility theory, some authors proposed the betweenness 
axiom which is weaker than the independence axiom. 
 Let F3 be a compound lottery ( F1, p ; F2, 1-p ) where F1 I F2 [i.e. U (F1) = U (F2)]. 
 Theorem 1 together with the betweenness axiom imply that, in the moment space of 
lotteries, F3 is a convex combination of F1 and F2 for any value of p. In other words, 
betweenness axiom implies that the indifference curves in the moment space of lotteries 
are linear. Since the betweenness axiom is weaker than the independence axiom, it follows 
that the linearity property of the indifference curves also holds under the expected utility 
theory. In fact, the expected utility theory has a stronger implication, namely the 
functional U[F(.)] in Eq. (1) is linear. 
 Let us consider an example of what we have discussed so far. Suppose, for an individual 
seeking to maximize his utility, only the first two moments of the distribution matters, i.e. for 
him U = U 1 2( , )μ μ . The reader should note that this is the mean-variance utility theory 
because of the relationship, 2 22 1σ μ μ= − . According to the expected utility theory 
(independence axiom), U is linear. Let U = a + bμ1 - cμ2. Then we have 
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U = a + b.μ1 - c. μ12 - c.σ2    (3) 
 
The mean-variance utility theory normally assumes that individuals are risk averse. For this 
reason we have a negative coefficient for σ2. From Eq. (3), it is clear that U is not increasing 
in μ1. After a certain value of μ1, any increase in μ1 will lead to a decline in U. This is quite 
unacceptable for lotteries involving financial gains. Any increase in the expected returns from 
the lotteries is always good news. The reason for this decline in utility is obvious. Under the 
expected utility theory, mean-variance utility implies that (i) either the lotteries are restricted 
to only normal distributions or (ii) the utility function is quadratic. We are considering a 
general class of distributions because a compound lottery formed out of normal distributions 
is, in general, not a normal distribution. A quadratic utility function, U = a + bx - cx2 implies 
U = a + bμ1 - cμ2 as above. It also implies that after a certain level of income, utility is a 
declining function of income, x. 
 Under the betweenness axiom, we have 
 
U = a(U) + b(U).μ1 - c(U).μ2   (4) 
 
In this case, the indifference curves are linear in μ1 and μ2. However, in order to avoid any 
intersection of the indifference curves, another axiom called the Weak Axiom of 
Independence [Chew and MacCrimmon (1979)] is often invoked. It can be shown that even 
under betweenness, utility is not monotonically increasing in μ1 [Biswas (1994)]. The 
argument is simple. Since σ2 = μ2 - μ12, the combinations of μ1 and μ2 which satisfy the zero 
variance condition (σ2 = 0) is given by 
1
2
1 2μ μ=  . When the indifference curves in the 
1 2( , )μ μ space are linear, they must twice intersect the curve satisfying the relationship 1
2
1 2μ μ= . Therefore, there are two values of μ1 with σ2=0 which gives the same level of utility. 
This means U 21( 0)μ σ = reaches a maximum for some value of μ1. 
3 The Weak* Axiom Of Independence 
We have seen that linear indifference curves in the moment space of lotteries have an 
undesirable implication. Allais (1984) argued that the expected utility theory (more precisely 
the independence axiom) suffers from a serious drawback. Suppose, utility u(x) is an 
increasing function of x. A lottery defined on x∈[a, b] also induces lottery defined on the 
utility space, u∈U, because of the monotonic relationship between u and x. In the expected 
utility theory, the axioms lead to the conclusion that in comparing lotteries, only the expected 
utility is taken into account, whereas according to Allais, other moments of the utility 
distribution may play a crucial role in the choice. It is this idea which led him to construct the 
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famous "Allais paradox". For Allais' own formulation of a non-expected utility theory, the 
reader is referred to Allais (1984). 
 Earlier in the paper we have referred to the axiom of weak independence which runs as 
follows. 
 
Axiom of Weak Independence : Consider, three different lotteries F1, F2 and F3, such that F1 I 
F2. Given any probability 'p', there exists a probability 'q' for all possible F3, such that L1 I L2 
where L1= (F1, p ; F3, 1-p ) and L2 = (F2, p ; F3, 1-p). 
 
The weak axiom of independence is weaker than the betweenness axiom but it also requires 
the indifference curves in the moments space of lotteries to be linear and precludes any 
intersection of linear indifference curves in the region of feasibility. This is not good enough 
if we want utility to increase with increase in certain income, x, i.e. U 21( 0)μ σ = increasing 
positively with μ1. With this in mind we state a weaker version of the independence axiom. 
 
Weak* Axiom of Independence: Consider three lotteries F1, F2 and F3 such that F1 I F2, F1 P 
F3 and F2 P F3. We assume that given any probability 'p', there exists a probability 'q' such that 
L1 I L2 where L1 = (F1, p ; F3, 1-p) is preferred to F3 and L2 = (F2, q ; F3, 1-q). 
 
 The weak* axiom of independence, henceforth called the weak* axiom, rules out the 
possibility of strictly convex preferences. Let μ denote (μ1, μ2, ….. ) and consider two 
arbitrary vectors μ (1) and μ (2) such that U[μ (1)] = U[μ (2)]. Preferences are said to be non-
convex if 
U [t.μ (1) + (1- t). μ (2)] ≤ U [μ (1)] ; 0 < t < 1 
 In case of mean-variance utility, non-convex preferences imply that the indifference 
curves are weakly concave in the μ1 - μ2 plane (see figure 1). Note, weak concavity includes 
the possibility of linear indifference curves. 
 
Theorem 2 
If the weak* axiom of independence holds and U(μ) is continous in μ , then preferences must 
be non-convex everywhere in the moments space. 
 
Proof 
If preferences are not non-convex everywhere, and U is continuous, there must exist a convex 
subspace D of the moments space within which the preferences are convex. 
 Consider (1), (2), (3)μ μ μ ∈D s.t. U[ (1)]μ =U[ (2)]μ  and (3) (1) (1 )[ (2) (1)]μ μ δ μ μ= + + − . 
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 If μ has a finite dimension, μ (3) lies on the line joining μ(1) and μ(2) and is slightly 
outside μ(2). Convexity of preferences imply that U[μ(2)] > U[μ(3)]. Consider, μ(4) = p.μ(1) + 
(1-p). μ(3) where p is close to 1 so that due to the convexity of preferences 
U[μ(4)] > U[μ(1)] = U[μ(2)]. 
By the weak* axiom of independence, there must exist a 'q' such that μ(5) = q.μ(2) + (1-q). 
μ(3) and U[μ(4)] = U[μ(5)]. If the preferences are convex, 
U[μ(2)] > U[μ(4)] = U[μ(5)] 
because μ(2) can be expressed as a convex combination of two indifferent vectors of 
moments, μ(4) and μ(5). Thus we arrive at a contradiction with respect to the relationship 
between μ(2) and μ(4), if we allow for the convexity of preferences. 
 (Q. E. D.) 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
We must note that the weak* axiom of independence is closely related to an aversion of 
uncertainty. Even if an individual is indifferent between two lotteries, a compound lottery 
constructed out of the two, adds to the uncertainty by adding another step to the resolution 
process. According to the weak*axiom, any unnecessary complexity to the process of 
resolution may not be desirable and this is reflected in the non-convexity (including possible 
non-linearity) of preferences. 
4 Weak* Axiom, Non-Expected Utility and the Mean-Variance Theory 
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We shall now discuss the implications of the mean variance utility theory and the role of the 
weak* axiom in that context. The mean variance utility theory which forms the corner-stone 
of portfolio analysis assumes that utility is an increasing function of expected returns and is a 
declining function of the variance, 
 
U = U(μ1, σ2) ; U1 > 0, U2 < 0    (5) 
 
It can be shown that if U1 > 0 for all values of μ1, and U2 is negative for all values σ2, then the 
indifference curves in the μ1 - μ2 plane are concave, i.e., μ1 is a concave function of μ2 
[Biswas (1994)]. For example, in portfolio theory, it is often assumed that U is a linear 
function in μ1 and σ2 so that the indifference relationships are given by, 21 .μ α β σ= + . This 
can be simplified as 
2
1 1 2. .μ β μ α β μ+ = +   
It can be easily checked that 
1 2 1 2
2 2/ 0 and / 0d d d dμ μ μ μ> < . We have seen that the 
independence axiom does not allow for such a relationship and requires that along any 
indifference curve, μ1 must be a linear function of the form 1 2.μ α β μ= + . On the other hand, 
weak* axiom allows for concave indifference curves by theorem 2. Therefore Eq. (5) is 
plausible under the weak* axiom of independence. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the shape of indifference curves under the mean variance utility, 
satisfying the weak* axiom of independence. Horizontal distance from the curve representing, 
σ2 = 0 (i.e. 1/21 2μ μ= ) equals the variance of the lottery given the value of μ1. For example, for 
the lottery represented by the point d, in figure 1, the variance is the line segment, ed. This 
may be shown easily. Since 2 1/21 1σ μ μ= − , for a fixed value of 21 2,μ σ μΔ = Δ . Between the 
points e and d, μ1 is same. Therefore, σ2 = ed. The marginal rate of substitution between 
expected returns and the risk (variance) at 'a' is the slope of the indifference curve at 'a'. 
What is the economic significance of concave indifference curves in the μ1 – μ2 plane? 
Suppose a risk averse individual is considering a purchase of stocks with different variances 
of returns. Since he is risk averse, he will require higher expected returns from stocks with 
higher variances to keep him at the same level of utility. But the rate of compensation he will 
seek for additional risk will decline with the level of risk he has already undertaken 
compensated by higher expected returns. There is no irrationality in such behaviour, although 
this is repudiated by the independence axiom. It is also easy to see why such behaviour is 
consistent with an aversion to pure uncertainty, i.e., a compound lottery composed of two 
indifferent alternatives is inferior to the alternatives. In figure 1 consider a certain prospect, e, 
and an indifferent uncertain prospect, a. A compound lottery, g, reduces the expected return 
and the variance proportionately. However, given the expected return at g, the variance kg is 
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larger than the compensating variance kf. Clearly a proportionate fall in the variance is not 
enough to keep the individual on the same indifference curve. From figure 1, it is also clear 
that the individual's risk premium at 'a' is given by the vertical line segment, ad. Note, the 
concavity of the indifference curves is related to the extent of aversion to pure uncertainty, 
i.e., aversion to compound lotteries composed of equivalent prospects. Therefore, we would 
expect the risk premium under the mean variance utility to be at least as large as under the 
expected utility theory. In figure 1, ac measures the risk premium under expected utility 
theory. In this case, the indifference curves are linear and premiums decline proportionately 
with respect to the risk. We call ac the pure risk premium. We shall call the difference 
between the risk premium and the pure risk premium, cd, the uncertainty premium. If the 
individual is indifferent between a compound lottery composed of equivalent prospects and 
the prospects themselves, then the uncertainty premium vanishes and the risk premium equals 
the pure risk premium. Also note, when the variance is very small (risk in the small), 
uncertainty premium is of second order importance and the pure risk premium approximately 
equals the risk premium. 
5 Conclusion 
As we have seen, the weak* axiom of independence, in the context of mean variance analysis, 
allows aversion to pure uncertainty. But aversion to pure uncertainty need not be true in all 
cases. "The Doctor's Dilemma" [Sen (1986)] is an example for such a case. Suppose a doctor 
in the war front has two emergency patients requiring the same operation. But he has enough 
medical provision for the operation of only one patient. The doctor is indifferent in his choice 
between the two patients. The doctor can choose the patient directly and be certain of the 
patient to be operated upon. But he may prefer the use of a lottery of some kind for selecting 
the patient and thus prefer the introduction of uncertainty in the selection process. Whether a 
risk-averse individual is also averse to pure uncertainty or not will depend upon the context of 
the uncertain prospect within which he has to take a decision. Consequently, it is not likely 
that a simple general theory of choice under uncertainty would ever be found out. The 
independence axiom is an axiom which neutralizes the effect of pure uncertainty in decisions 
under uncertainty and simplifies the process of decision making. Unfortunately, numerous 
experiments have shown that the axiom fails in majority of cases and has generated a large 
literature on non-expected utility theories. 
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